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Ground Water Judge reasoned that the General Assembly granted
such power to the District, and allegations of injury are best left
initially to agency expertise. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed
the district court's ruling.
The court's analysis began with discussion of the differences
between "natural stream" and "ground water regulatory regimes." The
court found Goss' contentions were misplaced because the water in
question was designated ground water, not waters of a natural stream.
The court explained that the 1965 Ground Water Management Act
("GWMA") administers designated ground water priorities, a process
which differs in important respects from that of the 1969 Water Rights
Determination and Administration Act which governs waters of a
natural stream. Through a modified system of prior appropriation,
the Commission allocates designated ground water by permit, allowing
appropriation only to the point of reasonable depletion. The court
construed the legislative language as encompassing the Management
District's role in enforcing permit conditions and priorities for
designated ground water. This grant of authority includes quasijudicial decisions regarding well permits and disputes between well
owners. The court corroborated its position by declaring that the
Management District's own rules anticipate its role in enforcement
disputes, the Management District has authority to conduct hearings,
and the Management District has the Commission's resources available
to it in matters involving the enforcement of priorities. Lastly, the
Management District has discretion in its administration of wells,
rather than a non-discretionary duty. The context of the 1965 GWMA
provides that the Management District "may, by summary order,
prohibit or limit withdrawal of water from any well during any period
that it determines such withdrawal of water from said well would cause
unreasonable injury to prior appropriators."
The court held that the Ground Water Judge properly concluded
that alleged injury to a designated ground water priority is a matter
consigned initially to agency expertise and fact-finding. The court also
held that the Management District had authority both to hear Goss'
issuance request and to order the enforcement of the Goss Well
priority.
Sommer Poole
CONNECTICUT
City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington, No. XO1UWYCV
970140886, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1161 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 1,
2000) (holding plaintiff city had not established a prescriptive
easement against defendant town's riparian water rights).
In 1921, the Town of Washington ("Town") granted, by contract,
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the City of Waterbury ("City") permission to impair the Town's
riparian rights. The Town allowed the City to divert water from the
Shepaug River, which runs through the Town to a reservoir owned and
operated by the City, wherefrom the water would be used for the City's
municipal needs.
Under the contractual terms, the City was not to reduce the
Shepaug River's flow by more than 1.5 million gallons per day between
May 1 and November 1. Preceding this litigation, however, residents
of the Town and of other communities situated along the Shepaug
noticed lower-than-normal flows during the summer months.
Suspecting that the City was diverting water beyond its contractual
allowance, concerned residents contacted the state Department of
Environmental Protection and the Department of Health. When these
agencies created a task force to investigate the residents' concerns, the
City filed suit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The Town,
concerned citizens groups, and other municipalities with interests in
the Shepaug brought action against the City seeking relief. After the
superior court rendered its decision, the City moved for reargument.
The court granted the City's motion on the issue of whether the City
had established it had acquired a prescriptive easement against the
Town's riparian rights.
Upon reargument, the City admitted it had diminished the
Shepaug's flow to an extent greater than allowed under the 1921
contract. However, the City argued its excess diversions were adverse
to the Town's riparian rights, thus establishing a prescriptive
easement. The City further alleged the Town's failure to fulfill its
duties to both survey the river flows in a timely manner and determine
whether its property rights were being infringed upon negated the
"open, visible and notorious" requirement of adverse use. While
conceding that its excess diversions were not open and visible, the City
contended the landowner, against whom an easement was claimed,
had a duty to perform such an investigation.
Rejecting these arguments, the court initially noted the City's
opportunity to impair the river's flow beyond the authorized degree
existed only because the contract allowed for the permissive
imposition of the Town's riparian rights. Thus, the court found the
City's claim invalid because its adverse use was made pursuant to its
contractual rights.
The court held the Town was under no duty to use reasonable
diligence to discover the City's concealed adverse use. Instead, they
noted, "it is for the party who seeks to establish an easement.., to
exercise his claimed right so openly as to give the owner knowledge
and full opportunity to assert his own rights." Despite the fact that
individuals taking notice of the Shepaug's low water levels prompted
the controversy, the court maintained that evidence presented at trial
did not establish that the City's adverse use caused such a visible
difference in the river's flow so as to reveal that use to the casual
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observer. The court held the duty to demonstrate open visible use lies
with the claimant in adverse use cases and the City failed upon
reargument to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that its
impairment of the Town's riparian rights was conducted in such a
manner.
Jason Wells
Dineen v. Woodbury Inland Wetlands Agency, No. CV 980150299S,
2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2247 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2000)
(sustaining the appeal of an agency's approval of a permit application
on the grounds that the agency did not comply with its regulations
when reviewing and approving the application, and because the
agency's decision was not supported by substantial record evidence).
The Woodbury Inland Wetlands Agency ("Agency") approved a
permit application submitted by Roderick Taylor ("Taylor") to install a
steel pipe and electrical conduit for snowmaking. Plaintiff, Mary
Dineen ("Dineen"), appealed from the decision on the grounds that
the agency's decision was arbitrary, illegal, and an abuse of discretion.
First, the court determined that the appeal was timely, and that
Dineen, an aggrieved party under the statute, had standing. Next, the
court considered whether the Agency complied with its regulations
when it reviewed and approved the permit application. Dineen
argued the Agency failed to require Taylor to submit an application
containing sufficient information to satisfy the Agency's regulations,
and that it issued a summary ruling without conducting the necessary
review.
Section 6.1 of the Inland Wetlands and Watercourses
Regulations enumerates the factors the Agency must consider before
granting a permit application. In order to sustain the Agency's
decision, the court must determine that the Agency considered these
factors.
The regulations require that the Agency consider all evidence
offered at or before any public hearing and any reports from other
commissions or agencies. However, the record contained no evidence
that any public hearings were held, or that any reports were submitted.
The regulations also require the Agency to consider the environmental
impacts of and alternatives to the proposed action, as well as the
relationship between the short-term uses of the environment and the
enhancements of long-term productivity. A zoning enforcement
officer inspected the Taylor site and reported that no soil had fallen
into the nearby brook as a result of the work already completed, and
that 95% of the area where the work occurred was stabilized.
Although this information was relevant to the environmental impact
regarding the control of sediment and erosion problems, there was no
evidence that the environmental impact of the proposed installation of
the steel pipe was considered. Additionally, the court found the

